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Abstract 
In this paper the “willingness to pay” (wtp) approach and the utilitaristic one are compared in order to evaluate an educational 
project, such as an investment in human capital. In the first part, the differences between the two approaches are underlined. In 
the second part we show the important role that education can play on the probability of finding a job. In the third part a suitable 
model is introduced and the conditions under which the wtp approach systematically overestimates (or respectively 
underestimates) the social value of an educational program are shown. In all the considered cases, however, the wtp criterion 
seems not to be a suitable measure of educational social welfare. 
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1. Introduction 
In the education field, economic evaluations are often used as support in decision making. The role played by 
those instruments seems to be increased by two factors: 
1. the amplified demand for education services (also and above all at university and post-university level); 
2. the narrow possibilities of supply in a field characterized by limited (often insufficient) resources (both 
financial and non financial). 
If it is necessary to choose among alternative solutions in conditions of limited economic funds, the evaluation 
should analyze: 
1. the costs of the single education projects, including the so-called opportunity-costs, deriving from the giving 
up of possible alternatives; 
2. the benefits of the single actions, that is, all the positive consequences arising from the possible realization of 
the considered alternative. 
In such sense, economic evaluations do not have to be perceived only as instruments with the aim of limiting the 
costs of education; on the contrary, their role is to support the decision makers in choosing the most effective action, 
guaranteeing at the same time an optimal allocation of all the available resources (Ben-Yashar and Paroush 2003). 
It is also necessary to underline that the choice among alternative actions usually takes place under uncertain 
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conditions. The effects deriving from the realization of a specific action are linked to personal situations2. Therefore 
economic evaluations do not necessarily lead to choose the educational plan among those compared; they allow to 
point out only the project that, under such conditions, seems to be the most rational3. 
There are numerous evaluation models proposed in the literature: they constitute a set of rules (more or less 
shared) destined to guide public decision makers in the choice among compared alternative solutions; the aim is to 
determine the project or the projects that maximize the social welfare. The will to achieve such objective has 
stimulated the development of numerous economic theories and models. It is necessary to emphasize, in this sense, 
that universally accepted standards do not exist for such economic analyses: many of the proposed methodologies, 
in fact, are still debated or in phase of development. A thorough review of such methods falls beyond the scope of 
this paper; the attention will be here focused exclusively on two approaches, the utilitaristic and the so-called 
“willingness to pay” (wtp) approaches. 
Since it was proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the theory of the expected utility played a 
dominant role in the solution of the decision problems exposed to risk and/or uncertainty. Among them it is possible 
to insert those problems linked to the possible realization of public educational projects4. They represent an 
opportunity for unemployed young people to invest in their human capital and, in so doing, increasing the chance of 
success in a their career (i.e., the chance – but not the certainty – of finding a well paid job), just investing on their 
human capital.  
The problems in the application of the traditional economic instrument increase when we try to attribute a 
monetary value to assets that are not usually exchanged (bought or sold) on the market, or for which the observed 
market price is not a reliable measure of their social value. In particular, if the market always was characterized by 
perfect competition and if there always was an equilibrium between supply and demand, the price of produced 
goods (or services) would express the (maximum) wtp by the consumers (given their preferences), and the ability of 
the producers to realize the same goods at the lowest technically possible cost. In these cases, prices observed on the 
market would suitably reflect the value of the resources that a project consumes and of those it generates ex novo 
(Nuti 2001). 
Alternatively, it would be necessary to determine the amount of money that the single agent or the community as 
a whole are willing to pay in order to benefit of a change of their well-being or in order to preserve the actual well-
being5. The wtp, in such sense, represents the heart of the contingent valuations, which are usually based on direct 
survey and allow a company to determine the value that the community attributes to goods which are not traded in a 
market. The use of the contingent valuation in the elicitation of the wtp for a hypothetical change in the supply of 
public goods has found supporters6 and critics7. 
After underlying the role that education plays on the probability to find a job (see par. 2), a rather general model 
is introduced with the aim of underlining possible distortions created by the wtp approach in the valuation of an 
educational project, as opposed to the value assessed by the utilitaristic approach (see par. 3). This topic has been 
little debated in literature (Armantier and Treich 2004). This paper represents an attempt to fill the gap in the matter 
of public choices concerning educational programs. 
2. Investments in human capital, employability and earnings 
In the economy of education some questions have been at the centre of attention for decades. For example, it is 
frequently asked why people spend an ever increasing amount of time on education, what are the costs and the gains 
of such an investment, and why do countries seem to assign greater amounts of resources to the education of their 
young people (Gradstein and Justman 2000; Salinas-Jiménezet et al. 2006). 
 
2 The benefits that each student gets from a Master degree or a course of vocational formation are obviously linked to the abilities and the 
efforts made by the single student. 
3 The goodness of the choice, usually, cannot be demonstrated ex post (that is after the realization of the action), given the absence, in the 
same context, of an alternative. 
4 Consider, for instance, a Public Administration that has to decide whether to finance a vocational course or a Master Degree course. 
5 In the specific case, we can think to an educative project that, if realized, would increase for the students the chance of finding a job, by the 
use of collective resources to cover organizational costs (see. par. 3). 
6 See, inter alia, Mitchell and Carson (1989) and Carson et al. (1995). 
7 See, inter alia, Hausman (ed., 1993).  
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After the publication of Mincer’s (1958, 1974) and Becker’s (1964) papers, education has been considered as an 
investment in human capital, with its relative costs, gains and rates of return. Just the calculation of such rates is one 
of the main problems faced by economists; its solution could constitute the answer to some of the previous questions 
(and perhaps to many others). 
For approximately five decades, literature has shown a positive incidence of the educational level on the income 
(Card 1999, for a review; Ishikawa and Ryan 2002). Moreover, the most educated individuals, coeteris paribus, 
seem to pass a greater amount of time at work rather than being unemployed; in particular, the unemployment rate 
decreases as the education level increases in almost all the Countries of the OECD8. Furthermore, workers with a 
higher level of formal education find a job faster than less educated individuals (Devine and Kiefer 1991, for a 
survey).  
Usually, the literature that estimates the incidence on incomes differs from the literature that examines the 
relationship between education and (un)employment9: the former implicitly implies that higher levels of income are 
the only effect of education. The incidence on employability, instead, is often neglected or examined separately. 
Since earnings are a combination of salary and time dedicated to the job, both aspects need to be examined. In the 
literature there are not many contributions that have examined the incidence of employability on annual income 
(Ashenfelther and Ham 1979; Nickell 1979). 
As previously said, a good level of education and a better qualification seem to represent one sure answer to the 
risk of unemployment. It is not by chance that in the last years many developed economies have increased the 
percentage of their budgets towards the field of education10. 
It is necessary to remember, in such a case, the importance of decisions about the investments in education – such 
as those related to the other supplies of the public sector – regarding the amount of collective resources to be 
reserved for such services and the question of which of these services are to be the main objectives11.  
The shortage of available public resources, in fact, prevents the satisfaction of all the increased needs of society 
(such vision had been synthesized already in 1962 by Galbraith with the memorable expression «Public squalor, 
private splendor»). Anyway, many countries also perceive the necessity of reducing public expenditure. A question 
unavoidably arises from such discrepancies about the most opportune economic evaluation methods of public 
services, with the aim of guaranteeing a supply that, as much as possible, is at the same time efficient and effective.  
3. A simple model 
There are n agents in the economy. Each of them lives two periods: in the first period he looks for a job; in the 
second period he can either find a job or remain unemployed. At the beginning of the first period the agent ni ,...,1  
will have a wealth iw
12 and a probability ip  of becoming employed. This last status would guarantee him an 
income 0!iy  in the second period. The probability of remaining unemployed is instead equal to  ip1 . In the 
same time interval, therefore, his expected utility will be      iiiii wupywup  1 , with  .u  that represents the 
utility function of the money. Assume, in such sense, that all the agents have the same utility function  .u 13 and this 
is increasing, twice differentiable and concave. 
The decision maker can choose if a course has to be organized or not in the first period; if attended, it would 
increase of 0!iH  the probability of the agent i  finding a job in the following period. Therefore, his probability of 
becoming employed would increase to  iip H , while the probability of remaining unemployed would be reduced 
to  iip H1 . In case the course had to be activated, the per capita cost would be c , independently from the 
number of individuals who will actually attend the course14. 
 
8 For a thorough analysis, see inter alia OECD (2009). 
9 For a thorough analysis, see Mincer (1991a, 1991b), Nickell and Bell (1995), McKenna (1996) and Kettunen (1997), Castelló and 
Doménech (2002). 
10 For a thorough analysis, see OECD (2009) and Eurydice (2002) among the others. 
11 The need of taking into care economic evaluations about services distributed by public agencies arises, first of all, from the necessity to 
justify the relative expense to face the possible supply of alternative services. 
12 wi can be thought as an inheritance or as an endowment that the individual receives from his parents when he becomes economically 
independent from them. 
13 This is a restrictive hypothesis that permits interpersonal comparisons of utility levels among individuals. 
14 It could be, as an example, a general fiscal imposition necessary to cover the cost of the project if this was approved. 
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According to the first method, the course would have to be instituted if and only if 
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In other words one expects that, as a result of the educative project, the social utility increases (takes on a positive 
variation). Using a first-order Taylor development around  ii yw  , we get that: 
       cywuywucywu iiiiii # '  ; (2) 
 
analogously, around iw , we get that: 
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Inserting eqs. (2) and (3) into condition (1), the latter is almost equivalent to: 
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Note that condition (4) holds if: 
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The attention will be now focused on the wtp approach. The wtp iz  of agent i, with reference to the educational 
plan at hand, is defined by: 
              iiiiiiiiiiiiii zcwupzcywupwupywup   HH 11 . (6) 
 
Using, also in this case, a first-order Taylor development around  ii yw  , we get that: 
       iiiiiiii zcywuywuzcywu # ' . (7) 
 
Analogously, around iw , we get that: 
       iiiiii zcwuywuzcwu # ' . (8) 
 
Inserting eqs. (7) and (8) into condition (6), the latter is almost equivalent to: 
              > @# iiiiiiiiiiii ywuzcywupwupywup '1 H         > @iiiii wuzcwup '1  H . (9) 
 
Through some algebra, we get that: 
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Passing from an individual level to an aggregated level, the average net wtp Z  will be almost equal to: 
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Therefore, the wtp criteria reduces to verify if: 
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It is necessary to specify that the criteria expressed by condition (12) is generally not equivalent to the social 
utility expressed by condition (5). Moreover there is the possibility that the two approaches lead to different 
decisions in relation to the same project. It is easy to demonstrate it through a simple example. 
Example 1: Let us suppose, firstly, that the population is constituted by agents 1 and 2. The probabilities of 
finding employment in the second period are equal to    75.0 ,75.0, 21  pp ; such probabilities will increase by    05.0 ,05.0, 21  HH  if a course was attended (with a per capita cost 80 c ). Moreover, the two agents initially 
have a wealth    0001 ,100, 21  ww  and a job would guarantee them an income    0002 ,2000, 21  yy . The utility 
function that characterizes them is    xxu log . Applying condition (5), we get 8075.72  # cB , while using 
condition (12) we find 8082.90  !# cZ . In this specific case, the criteria based on the wtp tends to overestimate 
the value attributed to the project through the method of the social utility; moreover, the two approaches supply the 
decision maker with two contrasting results regarding the same course: in particular, by using the wtp approach, the 
project examined should have been approved; by using the social utility approach, on the contrary, the new 
educational course should not have been activated. Modifying the original wealth of the two agents to    0001 ,10000, 21  ww  and the per capita cost of the course to 113 c , other things being equal, applying 
condition (5), we get 11375.115  !# cB , while using condition (12) we find 11345.111  # cZ . In this case the 
wtp method leads to underestimating the value attributed to the project through the social utility approach; 
moreover, the two criteria would supply the decision maker two different results regarding the opportunity of 
realizing the course, although contrasting with the results of the previous case. Indeed, based on the wtp approach, 
the project would have been rejected; whereas, according to the social utility criteria the new course should have 
been realized. 
The question is under which conditions does the wtp approach lead systematically to overestimating or 
underestimating the value of the course obtained with the social utility approach? 
From a mathematical point of view, the first criteria overestimates the values supplied by the second one if15 
 
   > @
       
   > @
       > @
 



¦ ¦
¦
 
 
 
n
n
i
iiiiiii
n
i
iiii
iiiiiii
iiii
wupywup
n
wuywu
n
wupywup
wuywu
n 11
1
1
'1'1
1
'1'
1
HH
H
HH
H
 
0t BZ . (13) 
 
In order to answer this question it is useful to introduce the following Lemma. 
 
15 The introduction of the ratio 1/n to the numerator and the denominator of B with respect to the formula (5) does not modify the latter, but it 
allows to simplify some demonstrations that follow. 
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Lemma 1: Take a positive increasing (decreasing) function   o:xg . The condition 
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The proof is straightforward throughout the application of the Covariance rule. 
The effects of the four various sources of heterogeneity will be now examined singularly. 
Let us initially suppose that the heterogeneity regards exclusively the individual probabilities ip  of findin
Imposing, therefore, ii   HH , iwwi    and iyyi   , the inequality (13) reduces to: 
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Through some algebra, the condition (15) reduces to: 
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which always hold under Jensen’s inequality.  
So, in this case, the wtp criterion tends to systematically overestimating the value of the project defined
social utility method. It is easy to show it through another simple example. 
Example 2: Let us suppose that the population is constituted by agents 1 and 2. The probabilities of 
employment in the second period are equal to    75.0 ,90.0, 21  pp ; such probabilities will incre   05.0 ,05.0, 21  HH  if a course was attended. Moreover, the two agents initially have a    0001 ,1000, 21  ww  and a job would guarantee them an income    0002 ,2000, 21  yy . The utility funct
characterizes them is    xxu log . Applying condition (5), we get 83.131#B , while using condition (
find 76.133#Z . 
Let now consider the source of heterogeneity regarding the change in probability iH  that everyone attend
course should have in finding a job in the second period. Then, imposing ippi   , iwwi    and yi
inequality (13) reduces to: 
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Trough some algebra, the condition (17) further reduces to: 
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Applying Lemma 1 with xi  H ,          wuxpywuxpxg '1'   and   xxf   yields that the sign on 
the left-hand side of condition (18) is always positive, since the function  xg  is decreasing in x  and the function    xgxf /  is increasing in x . 
Also, in this case, the wtp criterion tends to systematically overestimating the value of the project defined by the 
social utility method. It is easy to show it through another simple example. 
Example 3: Let us suppose that the population is constituted by agents 1 and 2. The probabilities of finding 
employment in the second period are equal to    75.0 ,75.0, 21  pp ; such probabilities will increase by    05.0 ,10.0, 21  HH  if a course was attended. Moreover, the two agents initially have a wealth    0001 ,1000, 21  ww  and a job would guarantee them an income    0002 ,2000, 21  yy . The utility function that 
characterizes them is    xxu log . Applying condition (5), we get 10.183#B , while using condition (12) we 
find 62.185#Z . 
Assuming that the heterogeneity of the population regards the income that every agent would earn in the second 
period in case of employment (independently from the attendance of the course in the previous period16). Therefore, 
imposing ippi   , ii   HH  and iwwi   , inequality (13) reduces to:  
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Applying Lemma 1 with xyi  ,          wupxwupxg '1' HH   and      wuxwuxf   yields that 
the sign of the left-hand side of condition (19) is always positive, since the function  xg  is decreasing in x  and the 
function    xgxf /  is increasing in x . 
Also, in this case, the wtp criterion tends to systematically overestimating the value of the project defined by the 
social utility method. It is easy to show it through another simple example. 
Example 4: Let us suppose that the population is constituted by agents 1 and 2. The probabilities of finding 
employment in the second period are equal to    75.0 ,75.0, 21  pp ; such probabilities will increase by    05.0 ,05.0, 21  HH  if a course was attended. Moreover, the two agents initially have a wealth    0001 ,1000, 21  ww  and a job would guarantee them an income    0002 ,3000, 21  yy . The utility function that 
characterizes them is    xxu log . Applying condition (5), we get 36.143#B , while using condition (12) we 
find 50.145#Z . 
If we finally consider that the source of heterogeneity is the initial wealth of the agents, imposing ippi   , 
ii   HH  and iyyi   , inequality (13) reduces to: 
 
   > @
       
   > @
       > @
0
'1'1
1
'1'
1
1
1
11
!




¦
¦¦
 
 
 
n
i
ii
n
i
iin
ii
ii
wupywup
n
wuywu
n
wupywup
wuywu
n HH
H
HH
H . (20) 
 
 
16 It has been assumed, in fact, that the eventual attendance of the course affects positively the probability to become employed, not the flow 
of incomes. 
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In this case, imposing xwi  ,          xupyxupxg '1' HH   and      xuyxuxf  , by applying 
Lemma 1 again, it is not possible to identify the sign on the left-hand side of condition (20). In particular, the 
function  xg  is decreasing in x. The function    xgxf  is represented by: 
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and it may be both increasing and decreasing in x. So, in this case, the wtp method could lead to either 
overestimating or underestimating the value of the project defined by the social utility criterion; this situation is 
already depicted with the Example 1. 
All the previous Examples are summarized in Tab. 1. 
 
Table 1 – Examples of contrasting results provided by wtp and social utility approaches for the same educational project 
 
 Homogeneity Heterogeneity in pi Heterogeneity in Hi Heterogeneity in yi Heterogeneity in wi 
     case a case b 
Agent 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
u(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) log(.) 
pi 0.75 0.75 0.90 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Hi 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
yi 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 3000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
wi 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 100 1000 10000 1000 
Social utility 
approach 
(B in eq. 5) 
117.71 131.83 183.10 143.36 72.75 115.75 
wtp  
approach 
(Z in eq. 12) 
117.71 133.76 185.62 145.50 90.82 111.45 
 B = Z B < Z B < Z or B > Z 
Legend 
u(.): agent’s utility function of the money 
pi: agent’s initial probability of becoming employed 
Hi: change in probability that every agent attending the course should have in finding a job 
yi: income that every agent would earn if employed 
wi: agent’s original wealth 
 
More in general, it was demonstrated that: 
I if the heterogeneity regards only the original probability of finding a job, the wtp criterion tends to 
systematically overestimating the value of the project defined by the social utility method; 
II if the heterogeneity regards only the change in probability that every agent attending the possible educational 
course would have in finding a job, the wtp criterion tends to systematically overestimating the value of the 
project defined by the social utility method; 
III if the heterogeneity regards only the income that every agent would earn in the second period in case of 
employment, the wtp criterion tends to systematically overestimating the value of the project defined by the 
social utility method; 
IV if the heterogeneity regards only the initial wealth of the agents in the population, the wtp approach could lead 
to either overestimating or underestimating the value of the project defined by the social utility criterion. 
To understand I, consider a symmetric situation in which two identical individuals are willing to pay 100 for an 
increase of 1 in 100 of finding a job. Since there is no heterogeneity, aggregate wtp coincides with social utility. 
Thus the project has a value of 200. Now, suppose that the project has an effect only on a single individual, so that it 
increases his job opportunity by 2 in 100. It easy to demonstrate that the project has the same social value in both 
cases. However, the wtp in equation (10) is convex in ip . Therefore, the aggregate wtp is now larger than in the 
symmetric situation. In other words, the wtp criterion overestimates the social value of a project because 
individuals’ wtp increase non-linearly with a change in initial probability of finding a job. 
To understand II, consider a symmetric situation in which two identical individuals face the same probability of 
finding a job. In this homogeneous society, the aggregate wtp for a probability increase program is equal to the 
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social value of the project. Now, suppose that the two agents face different baseline probabilities of the form 
G pp1  and G pp2 . Note that the wtp iz  in equation (10) is convex in iH . Therefore, the aggregate wtp is 
now larger than the wtp in the symmetric situation, while the social benefit of the project is the same. In other 
words, the wtp criterion leads to overestimating the social value of the project. 
The effect of income heterogeneity (statement III) may be intuitively understood considering the extreme case in 
which the distribution of income is assumed to be unbounded. In this situation, it is always possible to find a small 
number of individuals willing to pay for the entire project. In other words, there is no way to guarantee in this 
context that the wtp criterion will reject any socially inefficient project. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper is a theoretical attempt to investigate the relationship between wtp and social value of educative 
projects. At first it focuses on how economic evaluations can influence the decisional activities linked to educational 
projects, as possible investments in human capital (see par. 1). In particular, attention is focused on two alternative 
approaches, one based on the wtp and the other based on social utility. The aim is to determine under which 
conditions the first one lead to systematically overestimate (or underestimate) the social value of a educational 
project deriving from the application of the second one. Therefore, after underlying the role that education plays on 
the probability to find a job (see par. 2), a rather general model is introduced. This is characterized by four 
individual variables: initial wealth, occupational income, the chances of becoming employed and the change in the 
same probability deriving from the attendance of an educational program (see par. 3). 
From a formal point of view it has been possible to demonstrate that if agents only differ on the initial probability 
of becoming employed, or on the change in same probability deriving from the attendance of the educational course, 
or on the future occupational income, then the wtp approach leads to systematically overestimate the value of the 
educational program given by the social utility method. No univocal conclusion, finally, is guaranteed when agents 
differ from each other only for their initial wealth. In all the considered cases, however, the wtp criterion seems not 
to be a suitable measure of educational social welfare. 
Anyway, further research is necessary in order to estimate the magnitude of the distortion provided by the wtp 
approach, particularly in the presence of simultaneous sources of heterogeneity and agents’ different utility 
functions of the money. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1 
According to covariance rule, let  .g  a weakly increasing function, then    > @ 0, dxhxgCov  for all x  if and only 
if  .h  is weakly decreasing. It implies that 
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Imposing     )( iii xgxfxh  , if  .g  is positive, inequality (22) becomes 
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